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Abstract
We characterize epistemic consequences of truthful communication among ra-
tional agents in a game-theoretic setting. To this end we introduce normal-form
games equipped with an interaction structure, which specifies which groups of
players can communicate their preferences with each other. We then focus on
a specific form of interaction, namely a distributed form of iterated elimination of
strictly dominated strategies (IESDS), driven by communication among the agents.
We study the outcome of IESDS after some (possibly all) messages about players’
preferences have been sent. The main result of the paper, Theorem 4.9, provides
an epistemic justification of this form of IESDS.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and framework
One of the main topics in the area of multiagent reasoning is study of epistemic rea-
soning of communicating agents in a distributed setting, see, e.g., (Fagin et al., 1997;
Chandy and Misra, 1986). Game theory focuses on interaction between different types
of agents, namely rational agents, whose objective is to maximize their utility.
Our interest is to analyze epistemic reasoning of agents who exhibit both char-
acteristics, i.e. who communicate and are rational. We assume that such agents are
involved in distributed decision making, by which we mean an interactive process dur-
ing which agents repeatedly combine their local information with new information
obtained through communication with other agents in order to arrive at a (possibly
common) conclusion by means of a deductive process.
∗The first and third authors were supported by a GLoRiClass fellowship funded by the European Com-
mission (Early Stage Research Training Mono-Host Fellowship MEST-CT-2005-020841). Most of this work
was done at the Institute for Logic, Language and Computation, University of Amsterdam, Netherlands.
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To make such a general study meaningful we focus on a specific instance of dis-
tributed decision making, namely iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies
(IESDS, (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991)) driven by the acquisition of new information
through communication. In our setup each agent repeatedly combines local informa-
tion about his preference among his strategies with new information acquired through
interaction with other agents. This allows each agent to increasingly eliminate more
strategies. We are interested in characterizing knowledge of each agent at the end of
this decision making process.
To formalize this setting we introduce a game-theoretic framework which combines
locality and interaction. We assume a setting of imperfect information in which the
players’ preferences are not commonly known. Instead, the initial information of each
player only covers his own preferences, and the players can truthfully communicate
this information in the fixed groups to which they belong. So locality refers to the
information about preferences and interaction refers to communication within (possibly
overlapping) groups of players.
To realize this framework we augment a normal-form game with an interaction
structure of (Apt et al., 2009) that consists of (possibly overlapping) groups of players
within which synchronous communication is possible.
More precisely, we make the following assumptions:
• the players initially know the interaction structure and their own preferences,
• they are rational, in the sense that they would not play a strictly dominated strat-
egy,
• they can communicate atomic information about their preferences within any
group they belong to,
• once a message is communicated, it is commonly known within the group,
• communication is truthful and synchronous,
• the players have no knowledge other than what follows from these assumptions,
• the above assumptions are common knowledge.
In our communication setting, intuitively, information can be either unknown to
some player or commonly known in a group. Acting on partial information thus neces-
sitates to figure out precisely which information is commonly known in a group. Note
that in this context strategic (i.e., possibly untruthful) communication conveys no con-
clusive information. Consequently, study of epistemic consequences of such commu-
nication requires additional assumptions, like probability distributions over statements
and meanings, and can be carried out only after the setting with truthful communica-
tion has been investigated. We therefore focus on truthful communication and return
briefly to this matter in Section 5.
The following example illustrates the general procedure that we examine.
Example 1.1. Assume three players 1, 2, 3 (row, column, and matrix player) who can
only communicate pairwise and who play the following game, where ordinal prefer-
ences are represented by numerical payoffs:
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L R
U 0, 1, 0 0, 0, 1
D 1, 0, 0 1, 1, 1
A
L R
U 0, 1, 1 0, 0, 0
D 1, 0, 1 1, 1, 0
B
Note that the payoffs of players 1 and 2 do not depend on the strategy on player 3
and the payoff of player 3 depends only on the strategy of player 2. This game can
easily be solved by iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, yielding the
profile (D,R,A). However, assuming that each player is ignorant about the other play-
ers’ preferences, the initial situation looks as follows from the perspective of players 1,
2, and 3, respectively:
L R
U 0, ., . 0, ., .
D 1, ., . 1, ., .
A
L R
U 0, ., . 0, ., .
D 1, ., . 1, ., .
B
L R
U ., 1, . ., 0, .
D ., 0, . ., 1, .
A
L R
U ., 1, . ., 0, .
D ., 0, . ., 1, .
B
L R
U ., ., 0 ., ., 1
D ., ., 0 ., ., 1
A
L R
U ., ., 1 ., ., 0
D ., ., 1 ., ., 0
B
Given player 1’s rationality, he will not play U , as it is strictly dominated by D.
However, in the current situation, neither of the other two players can exclude player 1’s
playing U , given the information at their disposal.
Assume now that player 1 communicates his preferences to player 2, thus creating
common knowledge about them (among himself and player 2). Player 2’s picture then
looks as follows:
L R
U 0, 1, . 0, 0, .
D 1, 0, . 1, 1, .
A
L R
U 0, 1, . 0, 0, .
D 1, 0, . 1, 1, .
B
Player 2, knowing that player 1 is rational, can conclude that player 1 will not
play U . Consequently player 2 can remove his own strategy L from consideration,
since with player 1 playing D, L is dominated by R. If player 2 now communicates
his preferences both to players 1 and 3, then player 1 will be able to conclude that
player 2 will not play L; however, player 3 will not be able to conclude this, since he
lacks the information that player 2 knows that player 1 will not play U . Given that
communication is only about players’ own preferences, and given that in this example
we only allowed pairwise communication, player 3 will not be able to deduce that
player 2 will play R, and consequently will not be able to eliminate his strategy B.
In this paper, we look at settings of restricted communications like in this example,
and characterize exactly what strategies can be safely eliminated at different stages of
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communication.
1.2 Results
We study the outcome of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS)
in the above setting in any state of partial communication (i.e., where some messages
about players’ preferences have been sent), and in particular in the state of full com-
munication, where all communication permitted by the interaction structure has taken
place. In terms of distributed decision making, local information consists of players’
preferences and new information consists of information about other players’ pref-
erences obtained through the received messages. In turn, deduction consists of the
elimination of strategies, and the conclusion is the outcome of IESDS.
We use the results from our previous work (Apt et al., 2009) to prove that this
outcome realizes an epistemic formula that describes what the players know in the
considered partial communication state.
1.3 Background and related work
Our epistemic analysis belongs to a large body of research within game theory con-
cerned with the study of players’ knowledge and beliefs, see, e.g. (Battigalli and Bo-
nanno, 1999). In particular, (Brandenburger and Dekel, 1987) and (Tan and Werlang,
1988) have shown that if the payoff functions are commonly known and the players are
rational and have common knowledge of each other’s rationality, they will only play
strategies that survive IESDS, where one uses strict dominance by a mixed strategy.
When one restricts one’s attention to pure strategies, then, as shown in (Apt and
Zvesper, 2010a), the above implication holds for arbitary games. It is also clarified
there that the corresponding implication does not hold for weak dominance, even for
finite two-player games.
The mathematical reason is that the global version of strict dominance, sdg , that we
introduce in Section 4.2 is monotonic, while the global version of weak dominance is
not. Now, our approach crucially depends on the monotonicity of sdg , which explains
why the results of our paper do not carry over to weak dominance.
The concept of IESDS is closely related to that of rationalizability of (Bernheim,
1984; Pearce, 1984) that focuses on the strategies that survive iterated elimination of
never best responses. In fact, (see, e.g. (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994a, Proposition
61.2)) the concepts of a strict dominance by a mixed strategy and of a never best re-
sponse to a correlated strategy coincide. However, we use here only pure strategies,
and consequently in our setup these concepts differ.
Further, as shown in (van Benthem, 2007), for finite games the outcome of IESDS
can be characterized using the concept of a public announcement due to (Plaza, 1989).
In (Apt and Zvesper, 2010b) we generalized this characterization to infinite games and
clarified that it holds for monotonic dominance notions, including the global version of
strict dominance, but excluding the customary strict dominance.
Our framework stresses the locality of information about preferences in combina-
tion with communication and consequently leads to a different epistemic analysis. In
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particular, in our setting the analysis of players’ knowledge requires taking into account
players’ reasoning about group communication.
It is useful to clarify the difference between our framework and graphical games
of (Kearns et al., 2001). In these games a locality assumption is formalized by assuming
a graph structure over the set of players and using payoff functions which depend only
on the strategies of players’ neighbors. The absence of communication precludes a
distributed view of IESDS.
1.4 Plan of the paper
In Section 2, we review the basic notions concerning normal-form games, strict dom-
inance and operators on the restrictions of games. Next, in Section 3, we study the
outcome of IESDS in the presence of an interaction structure. We first look at the
outcome resulting after all communication permitted in the given interaction structure
has taken place, and then consider the outcome obtained in an arbitrary state of partial
communication.
The connection with knowledge is made in Section 4, where we provide in this
setting the epistemic characterization of IESDS. Finally, in Section 5, we suggest some
future research directions.
In the Appendix we provide the omitted proofs. An initial, short version of this
paper appeared as (Witzel et al., 2009).
2 Preliminaries
Following Osborne and Rubinstein (1994b), a normal-form game (in short, game) for
players N = {1, . . . , n} (with n > 1) is a tuple (S1, . . . , Sn,%1, . . . ,%n), where for
each i ∈ N ,
• Si is the non-empty, finite set of strategies available to player i. We write S to
abbreviate the set of strategy profiles: S = S1 × · · · × Sn.
• %i is the preference relation (i.e., a complete transitive reflexive binary relation)
for player i, so %i⊆ S × S.
Since we are considering strict dominance, we will use from now on only the strict
counterparts of the preference relations, denoted by i. In this qualitative approach
one cannot introduce mixed strategies. However, they are not used in our approach.
The extension of our results to the iterated elimination of strict dominance by a mixed
strategy is not obvious. The reason is that in the proofs we crucially rely on the fact
that one can form a finite disjunction over the set of strictly dominating strategies. In
specific examples we shall use the customary payoff functions.
As usual we denote player i’s strategy in a strategy profile s ∈ S by si, and the
tuple consisting of all other strategies by s−i, i.e., s−i = (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sn).
Similarly, we use S−i to denote S1 × · · · × Si−1 × Si+1 × · · · × Sn, and for s′i ∈ Si
and s−i ∈ S−i we write (s′i, s−i) to denote (s1, . . . , si−1, s′i, si+1, . . . , sn). Finally,
we use s′i s−i si as a shorthand for (s′i, s−i) i (si, s−i).
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In the subsequent considerations each considered game is identified with the set
of statements of the form s′i s−i si, where i ∈ N , si, s′i ∈ Si, and s−i ∈ S−i and
both strict dominance notions are formulated in terms of such statements. Therefore
the results of this paper apply equally well to the strategic games with parametrized
preferences introduced in (Apt et al., 2008). In these games instead of the preferences
relations 1, . . . ,n, for each joint strategy s−i of the opponents of player i a strict
preference relation s−i over the strategies of player i is given. So in strategic games
with parametrized preferences players cannot compare two arbitrary strategy profiles.
Fix now an initial game G := (S1, . . . , Sn,1, . . . ,n). We say that the tuple
(S′1, . . . , S
′
n) is a restriction of G if each S′i is a subset of Si. We identify the restriction
(S1, . . . , Sn) with G.
The restrictions of G are ordered by the component-wise set inclusion:
(G1, . . . , Gn) ⊆ (G′1, . . . , G′n) iff Gi ⊆ G′i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
To analyze iterated elimination of strategies from the initial game G, we view such
procedures as operators on the finite lattice formed by the set of restrictions of G or-
dered by the above inclusion relation.
For any restriction G′ := (S′1, . . . , S′n) of G and strategies si, s′i ∈ Si, we say that
si is strictly dominated by s′i on S′−i, and write s′i S′−i si, if s′i s′−i si for all
s′−i ∈ S′−i. We use
sd(si,G′) to abbreviate ¬∃s′i ∈ S′i ∀s′−i ∈ S′−i s′i s′−i si.
That is, sd(si,G′) holds iff strategy si of player i survives elimination of strictly dom-
inated strategies with respect to S′i, i.e., iff it is not strictly dominated on S
′
−i by any
strategy from S′i.
Given an operator T on a finite lattice (D,⊆) with the largest element >, X ∈ D,
and k ≥ 0, we denote by T k(X) the k-fold iteration of T starting at X , so with
T 0(X) = X , and put T∞(X) :=
⋂
k≥0 T
k(X), where
⋂
is the meet operation en-
tailed by ⊆. We abbreviate Tα(>) to Tα.
We call T monotonic if for all X,Y ∈ D, we have that X ⊆ Y implies T (X) ⊆
T (Y ), and contracting if for all X ∈ D we have that T (X) ⊆ X .
Finally, as in (Apt et al., 2009), an interaction structure H is a hypergraph on N ,
i.e., a set of non-empty subsets of N , called hyperarcs.
3 Iterated strategy elimination
In this section we define procedures for iterated elimination of strictly dominated strate-
gies. Let us fix a game G = (S1, . . . , Sn,1, . . . ,n) for playersN and an interaction
structure H ⊆ 2N \ {∅}. In Section 3.1, we look at the outcome reached after all com-
munication permitted by H has taken place, that is, when within each hyperarc of H
all of its members’ preferences have been communicated. In Section 3.2, we then look
at the outcomes obtained in any particular state of partial communication.
The formulations we give here make no direct use of a formal notion of knowledge.
The connection with a formal epistemic model is made in Section 4. All iterations of
the considered operators start at the initial restriction (S1, . . . , Sn).
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3.1 Full communication
Let us assume that within each hyperarc A ∈ H , all players in A have shared all
information about their preferences. We leave the precise definition of communication
to Section 3.2.
For each group of players A ⊆ N , let SA denote the set of those restrictions of G
which only restrict the strategy sets of players from A. That is,
SA := {(S′1, . . . , S′n) | S′i ⊆ Si for i ∈ A and S′i = Si for i 6∈ A}.
We now define a contracting operator TA on the set SA as follows. For each G′ =
(S′1, . . . , S
′
n) ∈ SA, let TA(G′) := (S′′1 , . . . , S′′n), where for all i ∈ N ,
S′′i :=
{ {si ∈ S′i | sd(si,G′)} if i ∈ A
S′i otherwise.
We call T∞A the outcome of IESDS on A. We then define the restriction G(H) of G as
1 G(H) := (G(H)1, . . . ,G(H)n), where for all i ∈ N ,
G(H)i := T{i}
(⋂
A:i∈A∈H T
∞
A
)
i
.
That is, the ith component of G(H) is the ith component of the result of applying T{i}
to the intersection of T∞A for all A ∈ H containing i. We call G(H) the outcome of
IESDS with respect to H . Note that T is contracting.
Let us “walk through” this definition to understand it better. Given a player i
and a hyperarc A ∈ H such that i ∈ A, T∞A is the outcome of IESDS on A, start-
ing at (S1, . . . , Sn). The strategies of players from outside of A are not affected by
this process. This elimination process is performed simultaneously for each hyperarc
that i is a member of. By intersecting the outcomes, i.e., by considering the restric-
tion
⋂
A:i∈A∈H T
∞
A , one arrives at a restriction in which all such “groupwise” iterated
eliminations have taken place. However, in this restriction some of the strategies of
player i may not survive elimination. They are eliminated using one application of the
T{i} operator. We illustrate this process, and in particular this last step, in the following
example.
Example 3.1. Consider the following three-player game G where player 3 chooses
between the left (A) and the right (B) table.
Pl. 1
Pl. 2
L R
U 1, 1, 1 0, 0, 1
D 0, 1, 1 1, 0, 1
A
Pl. 2
L R
U 0, 1, 0 0, 0, 0
D 1, 1, 0 1, 0, 0
B
So, for example, the payoffs for the strategy profile (U,L,B) are, respectively, 0, 1,
and 0. Now assume the interaction structure H = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}}. We obtain the
1Here and elsewhere we omit the outer brackets preceding the outer subscript ‘i’, so G(H)i denotes
(G(H))i, etc.
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12 3
L  R A  B
U  D
Figure 1: Illustrating Example 3.1. Hyperarcs are shown in gray. Callouts attached
to hyperarcs represent communicated, and thus commonly known, information. The
thought bubble represents private information, in this case obtained from the combina-
tion of information only available to player 1.
outcomes T∞{1,2} = ({U,D}, {L}, {A,B}) and T∞{1,3} = ({U,D}, {L,R}, {A}). The
restriction defined by these two outcomes is ({U,D}, {L}, {A}), and in the final step
player 1 eliminates his strategy D by one application of T{1}. The outcome of the
whole process is thus G(H) = ({U}, {L}, {A}). See Figure 1 for an illustration of
this situation.
In this example, the outcome with respect to the given interaction structure coin-
cides with the outcome of the customary IESDS applied to the initial game. However,
this is not the case in general, and the purpose of this example is simply to illustrate
how the operators work. Example 3.3 later on shows in a different setting how the
interaction structure can affect the outcome.
Note that when H consists of the single hyperarc N that contains all the players,
then for each player i,
⋂
A:i∈A∈H T
∞
A reduces to T
∞
N , and this is closed under applica-
tion of each operator T{i}. So then G(H) = T∞N , that is, G(H) coincides then with the
customary outcome of iterated elimination strictly dominated strategies.
In general, this customary outcome is included in the outcome w.r.t. any hyper-
graph H , as the following result shows.
Theorem 3.2. For any game G and hypergraph H we have T∞N ⊆ G(H).
Noting that T∞N = G({N}), this can be interpreted as a special case of a mono-
tonicity property: If H is a refinement of H ′, then H ′ allows more communica-
tion to take place, and thus more strategies to be eliminated, than H . In symbols,
G(H ′) ⊆ G(H). Since we are not going to use this property, we restrict ourselves to
the simpler version as stated.
The inclusion proved in this result cannot be reversed, even when each pair of play-
ers shares a hyperarc. The following example also shows that the hypergraph structure
is more informative than the corresponding graph structure.
Example 3.3. Consider the following game with three players, where player 3 chooses
between the left (A) and the right (B) table.
Pl. 1
Pl. 2
L R
U 0, 1, 0 0, 0, 1
D 1, 0, 0 1, 1, 1
A
Pl. 2
L R
U 0, 1, 1 0, 0, 0
D 1, 0, 1 1, 1, 0
B
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Note that the payoffs of player 1 and 2 depend only on each other’s choices, and
the payoff of player 3 depends only on the choices of player 2 and 3.
If we assume the hypergraph H that consists of the single hyperarc {1, 2, 3},
then the outcome of IESDS w.r.t. H is the customary outcome which equals
({D}, {R}, {A}). Indeed, player 1 can eliminate his strictly dominated strategy U ,
then player 2 can eliminate L, and subsequently player 3 can eliminate B.
In contrast, if the hypergraph consists of all pairs of players, that is, H = {{1, 2},
{2, 3}, {1, 3}}, then the outcome of IESDS w.r.t. H equals ({D}, {R}, {A,B}).
Indeed, in order for 3 to be able to eliminate B, he would have to know that 2 has
eliminated L. However, the second hypergraph H = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}} does not
allow this: although 2 and 3 can both learn that 1 eliminates U , they learn it together.
So in particular the information that 2 knows that 1 eliminates U is not available to 3,
who thus does not learn that she eliminates L.
More formally, the result can be calculated as follows:
T{1}(∩A:i∈A∈HT∞A )1 = T{1}(T∞{1,2} ∩ T∞{1,3})1
= T{1}(({D}, {R}, {A,B}) ∩ ({D}, {L,R}, {A,B}))1
= T{1}({D}, {R}, {A,B})1
= {D},
T{2}(∩A:i∈A∈HT∞A )2 = T{2}(T∞{1,2} ∩ T∞{2,3})2
= T{2}({D}, {R}, {A,B}) ∩ ({U,D}, {L,R}, {A,B})2
= {R}, and
T{3}(∩A:i∈A∈HT∞A )3 = T{3}(T∞{1,3} ∩ T∞{1,3})3
= T{3}({U,D}, {L,R}, {A,B}) ∩ (({D}, {L,R}, {A,B}))3
= {A,B}.
3.2 Partial communication
The setting considered in Section 3.1 corresponds to a state in which in all hyperarcs all
players have shared all information about their preferences. Given the game G and the
hypergraph H , the outcome G(H) there defined thus reflects which strategies players
can eliminate if initially they know only their own preferences and they communicate
all their preferences in H . We now define formally what communication we assume
possible, and then look at states in which only certain preferences have been commu-
nicated. Such states may be stages on the way to full communication, but may also
reflect situations in which communication has been incomplete.
Each player i can communicate his preferences to each A ∈ H with i ∈ A. A
message by i consists of a preference statement s′i s−i si for si, s′i ∈ Si and s−i ∈
S−i. We denote such a message by (i, A, s′i s−i si) and require that i ∈ A and that it
is truthful with respect to the given initial game G, that is, indeed s′i s−i si in G. Note
that the fact that i is the sender is, strictly speaking, never used. Thus, in accordance
with the interpretation of communication described in Section 1.1, we could drop the
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sender and simply write “the players in A commonly observe that s′i s−i si.” A
partial (communication) state is now given by the set M of messages which have
been communicated.
We now adjust the definition of strict dominance to account for partial states, such
that in a partial state given by M it uses only information shared among a given
group A. So with singleton A = {i} only i’s preferences are used, and with larger
A only preferences contained in messages to a superset of A are used:
• sd{i},M (si,G′) holds iff ¬∃s′i ∈ S′i ∀s−i ∈ S′−i s′i s−i si,
• sdA,M (si,G′) holds iff ¬∃s′i ∈ S′i ∀s−i ∈ S′−iMA s′i s−i si,
where A 6= {i} and by MA s′i s−i si we mean that s′i s−i si is entailed by
those messages in M which A received.
More precisely, the entailment relation
MA s′i s−i si
holds iff there exist messages (·, Ak, ski s−i sk+1i ) ∈M for k ∈ {1, . . . , `− 1} such
that Ak ⊇ A, s1i = s′i and s`i = si.
We now define a generalization of the TA operator by:
TA,M (G′) := (S′′1 , . . . , S′′n),
where G′ = (S′1, . . . , S′n) and for all i ∈ N ,
S′′i := {si ∈ S′i | sdA,M (si,G′)}.
Note that, as before, S′i remains unchanged for i 6∈ A, since then sdA,M (si,G′) always
holds. Indeed, for it to be false, there would have to be some message (i, A, ·) ∈ M ,
which would imply i ∈ A.
Similarly, we now define the outcome of IESDS with respect to H,M to be the
restriction G(H,M), where for i ∈ N
G(H,M)i :=
(
T{i},M
(⋂
A:i∈A∈H T
∞
A,M
))
i
.
Here H denotes the closure of H under non-empty intersection. That is,
H = {A1 ∩ · · · ∩Ak | {A1, . . . , Ak} ⊆ H} \ {∅}.
The use ofH is necessary because certain information may be entailed by messages
sent to different hyperarcs. For example, with (j, A, s′′j s−j s′j), (j, A′, s′j s−j sj) ∈
M , the combined information that s′′j s−j sj is available to the members of A ∩A′.
Again, let us “walk through” the definition of G(H,M). First, a separate elimi-
nation process is run on each hyperarc of H , using only information which has been
communicated there (which now no longer covers all members’ preferences, but only
the ones according to the partial stateM ). Then, in the final step, each player combines
his insights from all hyperarcs of which he is a member, and eliminates any strategies
that he thereby learns not to be optimal.
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3
L s−2 R
A s−3 B
1
2
3
L s−2 R
A s−3 B
1
2
3
L s−2 R
A s−3 B
1
2
3
L s−2 R
A s−3 B
U  D
M M ′ M ′′
Figure 2: Illustrating Example 3.4.
Note that the underlying hypergraphH can be “recovered” from the set of messages
M used, that is, we could define H := {A | (., A, .) ∈ M}. However, explicit use
of the hypergraph allows us to compare the setting with partial information with that
of full information. Namely, it is easy to see that in the case where the players have
communicated all there is to communicate, i.e., for
MallH := {(i, A, s′i s−i si) | i ∈ N,A ∈ H, si, s′i ∈ Si with s′i s−i si in G},
the partial outcome coincides with the previously defined outcome, i.e.,
G(H,MallH ) = G(H).
This corresponds to the intuition that G(H) captures the elimination process when all
possible communication has taken place. In particular, all entailed information has
also been communicated in MallH , which is why we did not need to consider H in
Section 3.1.
The effect of full communication within a hyperarc A is that the players in A ac-
quire common knowledge of the set T∞A . However, to compute the final outcome of the
elimination process, that is G(H), each player combines this information across all hy-
perarcs he is a member of. Consequently, the players do not have common knowledge
of G(H). This point is illustrated in the following example.
Example 3.4. The process described in this example is illustrated in Figure 2. Con-
sider again the game G from Example 3.1, and the initial state where M = ∅. We
have T∞A,M = G for all A ∈ H , that is, without communication no strategy can “com-
monly” be eliminated. However, players 2 and 3 can “privately” eliminate one of their
strategies each, since each of them knows his own preferences, so
T{1},M (
⋂
A:1∈A∈H T
∞
A,M ) = ({U,D}, {L,R}, {A,B}),
T{2},M (
⋂
A:2∈A∈H T
∞
A,M ) = ({U,D}, {L}, {A,B}),
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2
4
A L B
A R C
B L C
1
3
2
4
 A  C
1
3
2
4
A  C
R −C L
1
3
2
4
A  C
R −C L
D  A,B,C
M M ′
Figure 3: Illustrating Example 3.5. Strategies of the dummy players are omitted. A 
C stands for A s−1 C, and −C combines α for α ∈ {A,B,D}. Note that in the
first step, information is not explicitly communicated but deduced.
T{3},M (
⋂
A:3∈A∈H T
∞
A,M ) = ({U,D}, {L,R}, {A}),
This elimination cannot be iterated further by other players and the overall outcome is
G(H,M) = ({U,D}, {L}, {A}).
Consider now the partial state M ′ = {(2, {1, 2}, L s−2 R) | s−2 ∈ S−2}, that
is, a state in which player 2 has shared with player 1 the information that for any joint
strategy of players 1 and 3, he prefers his strategy L over R. Then only the result of
player 1 changes:
T{1},M ′(
⋂
A:1∈A∈H T
∞
A,M ′) = ({U,D}, {L}, {A,B}),
while the other results and the overall outcome remain the same. If additionally player 3
communicates all his information in the hyperarc he shares with player 1, that is, if the
partial state is M ′′ = M ′ ∪ {(3, {1, 3}, A s−3 B) | s−3 ∈ S−3}, then player 1 can
combine all the received information and obtain
T{1},M ′′(
⋂
A:1∈A∈H T
∞
A,M ′′) = ({U}, {L}, {A}).
This is also the overall outcome G(H,M ′′), coinciding with the outcome G(H,MallH )
where all possible information has been communicated.
Let us now illustrate the importance of using entailment in the optimality notions
for partial states and H (rather than H) in the definition of G(H,M).
Example 3.5. We look at a game involving four players, but we are only interested in
the preferences of two of them. The other two players serve merely to create different
hyperarcs. The strategies and payoffs of player 1 and 2 are as follows:
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Pl. 1
Pl. 2
L R
A 3, 0 1, 1
B 2, 0 1, 1
C 1, 1 0, 0
D 0, 0 5, 1
For players 3 and 4 we assume a “dummy” strategy, denoted respectively by X
and Y . Consider the hypergraph H = {{1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}} and the partial state
M = {(1, {1, 2, 3}, A LXY B),
(1, {1, 2, 4}, B LXY C),
(1, {1, 2, 3}, A RXY C)}.
The fact that player 1, independently of what the remaining players do, strictly
prefers A over C is not explicit in these pieces of information, but it is entailed by
them, since A LXY B and B LXY C imply A LXY C. However, this combina-
tion of information is only available to the players in {1, 2, 3} ∩ {1, 2, 4}.
Player 2 can make use of this fact that C is dominated, and eliminate his own strat-
egy L. If we now look at a state in which player 2 has communicated his relevant
preferences, so M ′ = M ∪ {(2, {1, 2, 3}, R αXY L) |α ∈ {A,B,D}}, we notice
that player 1 can in turn eliminate A and B, but only by combining information avail-
able to the players in {1, 2, 3} ∩ {1, 2, 4}. There is no single hyperarc in the original
hypergraph which has all the required information available. It thus becomes clear that
we need to take into account iterated elimination on intersections of hyperarcs.
The whole process is illustrated in Figure 3.
4 Epistemic foundations
In this section, we provide epistemic foundations for our framework. The aim is to
prove that the definition of the outcome G(H,M) correctly captures what strategies
the players can eliminate using all they “know”, in a formal sense.
We proceed as follows. First, in Section 4.1, we briefly introduce an epistemic
model formalizing the players’ knowledge. We apply the basic framework and results
from (Apt et al., 2009). In Section 4.2, we give a general epistemic formulation of strict
dominance and argue that it correctly captures the notion. Section 4.2 also contains the
main result of our epistemic analysis, namely that the outcome G(H,M) indeed yields
the outcome stipulated by the epistemic formulation.
4.1 Epistemic language and states
Again, we assume a fixed game G with non-empty set of strategies Si for each player i,
and a hypergraph H representing the interaction structure. Analogously to (Apt et al.,
2009), we use a propositional epistemic language with a set At of atoms which is
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divided into disjoint subsets Ati, one for each player i, where Ati := {s′i s−i si |
si, s
′
i ∈ Si, s−i ∈ S−i}.
The set Ati describes all possible strict preferences between pairs of strategies of
player i, relative to a joint strategy of the opponents. A valuation V is a subset of the
atoms At such that for each s−i ∈ S−i, the restriction V ∩ {· s−i ·} is a strict partial
order. 2
Intuitively, a valuation consists of exactly the atoms assumed true. Each specific
game G induces exactly one valuation which simply represents its preferences. How-
ever, in general we also need to model the fact that players may not have full knowledge
of the game. The restriction imposed on the valuations ensures that each of them is in-
duced by some game.
So for example {s a t} is a valuation (given a game with appropriate strategy
sets), while {s a t, t a u} and {s a t, t a s} are not (the former failing to make
s a u true).
Recall from Section 3.2 that a message from player i to a hyperarc A ∈ H has
the form (i, A, s′i s−i si), where i ∈ A, si, s′i ∈ Si, and s−i ∈ S−i. We say that a
message (·, ·, p) is truthful with respect to a valuation V if p ∈ V . A state, or possible
world, is a pair (V,M), where V is a valuation and M is a set of messages that are
truthful with respect to V .
For a set of messagesM ,A ⊆ N , and p ∈ At,MA p is defined as in Section 3.2.
That is, M A p means that p is entailed by the messages in M received by A, for
example, by transitivity of the represented preference order.
In (Apt et al., 2009), we defined set operations to act component-wise on states,
e.g. (V,M) ⊆ (V ′,M ′) iff V ⊆ V ′ and M ⊆ M ′. However, the results we consider
also hold with a modified inclusion relation, whereM ⊆M ′ iff for each (i, A, p) ∈M
there is (i, A′, p) ∈ M ′ with A ⊆ A′. By Vi we denote V ∩ Ati, the restriction of V
to player i atoms. Further, Mi := {(·, A, ·) ∈ M | i ∈ A} is the set of messages that
player i received.
We now define an indistinguishability relation between states:
(V,M) ∼i (V ′,M ′) iff (Vi,Mi) = (V ′i ,M ′i).
For A ⊆ N the relation ∼A is the transitive closure of
⋃
i∈A ∼i.
We consider the following positive epistemic language L+:
ϕ ::= p | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | CAϕ,
where the atoms p denote the facts in At, while ∧ and ∨ are the standard connec-
tives;3 and CA is a knowledge operator, with CAϕ meaning ϕ is common knowledge
among A. The intuition for CA is that everybody in A knows ϕ, everybody knows that
everybody knows ϕ, etc. We write Ki for C{i}; Kiϕ can be read ‘i knows that ϕ’. For
a sequence of players w = i1 . . . ik, we write Kw to abbreviate Ki1Ki2 . . .Kik . Note
2 In (Apt et al., 2009) we did not consider such restrictions on valuations; however, the relevant results
can easily be seen to remain correct. See also (Witzel, 2009, Chapter 2).
3Since we want to eliminate strategies that are dominated, we only need to express facts of the form
s  t (or t  s), rather than their negated counterparts that would pertain to strategies not being dominated.
This observation generalizes to the formulas we consider.
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that this language does not contain negation, which is not needed in our presentation.
We assume that each player i initially knows the true facts in Ati entailed by the initial
game G and that the basic assumptions from Section 1.1 are commonly known among
the players.
The formal semantics is defined as follows (recall that each message in M is truth-
ful with respect to V ):
Definition 4.1.
(V,M)  p iff p ∈ V,
(V,M)  ϕ ∨ ψ iff (V,M)  ϕ or (V,M)  ψ,
(V,M)  ϕ ∧ ψ iff (V,M)  ϕ and (V,M)  ψ,
(V,M)  CAϕ iff (V ′,M ′)  ϕ for each (V ′,M ′)
with (V,M) ∼A (V ′,M ′).
Now we are ready to state the following results from (Apt et al., 2009), slightly
adapted to fit our notation.
Lemma 4.2 (from (Apt et al., 2009, Lemma 3.2)). For any ϕ ∈ L+ and states (V,M)
and (V ′,M ′) with (V,M) ⊆ (V ′,M ′),
if (V,M)  ϕ, then (V ′,M ′)  ϕ.
Theorem 4.3 (from (Apt et al., 2009, Theorem 3.5)). For any ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ L+, state
(V,M), and A ⊆ N ,
(V,M)  CA(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) iff (V,M)  CAϕ1 ∨ CAϕ2.
This theorem states that in this setting, knowledge distributes over disjunction,
when the formulas in question are positive. That might seem surprising, and so it
is worth emphasizing that the result does depend on the positivity of the formulas
(ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ L+), and also on the assumptions about communication, and therefore pos-
sible configurations of knowledge, that are inherent in our setup.
Lemma 4.4 (from (Witzel, 2009, Lemma 2.3.8), cf. (Apt et al., 2009, Lemma 3.7)).
For any A ⊆ N with |A| ≥ 2, p ∈ At, and state (V,M), the following are equivalent:
(i) MA p,
(ii) (V,M)  CAp
Theorem 4.5 (from (Apt et al., 2009, Theorem 3.8)). For any A ⊆ N , ϕ ∈ L+, and
state (V,M),
(V,M)  CAϕ iff (V,M)  Kwϕ for some permutation w of A.
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4.2 Correctness result
We use results from (Apt et al., 2009), summed up in Section 4.1, in order to prove that
the TG operator defined in Section 3 is correct with respect to an epistemic formulation
of our setting.
In order to simplify our presentation, we use a global version of strict dominance
(introduced by Chen et al. (2007)) instead of sd. We use
sdg(si,G′) to abbreviate ¬∃s′i ∈ Si ∀s′−i ∈ S′−i s′i s′−i si.
The difference is that sdg considers dominance by a strategy from the original set
Si, while sd considers dominance only by strategies from the set S′i that has survived
elimination in the subgame G′. So in sdg , it is stipulated that a strategy is not strictly
dominated by a strategy from the initial game. As noted in (Brandenburger et al., 2006;
Apt, 2007), sdg is monotonic, while sd is not.
In order to use sdg instead of sd, we need to show that our definitions and results
do not depend on the choice of strict dominance relation.
We first relate the global and the local version of strict dominance, slightly over-
loading notation by letting sd(G′) = ({si ∈ S′i | sd(si,G′)})i∈N , and similarly for
sdg . The two notions are equivalent in the following sense.
Lemma 4.6. Let G0,G1, . . . be a sequence of restrictions of the initial restriction
(S1, . . . , Sn), such that G0 = (S1, . . . , Sn) and sdg(Gk) ⊆ Gk+1 ⊆ Gk for all k ≥ 0.
Then for all k ≥ 0, sdg(Gk) = sd(Gk).
Intuitively, this claim can be stated as follows. Suppose that each restriction Gk+1
is obtained from Gk by removing some strategies that are strictly dominated in the
global sense. Then the local and global strict dominance coincide on each considered
restriction Gk. As a consequence, the result also holds if the strategies removed are
required to be strictly dominated in the local instead of the global sense.
Next, we show that the operators we defined in Section 3 produce sequences that
satisfy the conditions of Lemma 4.6, and thus coincide for the global and the local
version of strict dominance.
Lemma 4.7. For any hypergraph H and set of messages M , the outcome G(H,M)
does not depend on the choice of sd or sdg .
We now start the main task of this section by giving a formula describing the global
version of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies in the customary games.
We define, for i ∈ N and si ∈ Si,
domin1(si) :=
∨
s′i∈Si
∧
s−i∈S−i s
′
i s−i si,
domin`+1(si) :=
∨
s′i∈Si
∧
s−i∈S−i
(
s′i s−i si ∨
∨
j∈N\{i} domin
`(sj)
)
.
The following simple result relates this formula to the TN operator (that is, TG
where G is the group of all players), where we assume sdg as the optimality notion.
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Proposition 4.8. For any game G, ` ≥ 1, and i ∈ N
(T `N )i = {si | domin`(si) does not hold}.
Consequently
(T∞N )i = {si | domin∞(si) does not hold}.
(The propositional formulas here are evaluated with respect to the valuation induced
by G.)
We now modify the above formula to an epistemic formula describing the iterated
elimination of strictly dominated strategies (in the sense of sdg) in games with inter-
action structures. In contrast to the above formulation the formula below states that
player i knows that a strategy is strictly dominated.
We define, for i ∈ N and si ∈ Si,
dom1(si) := Ki
∨
s′i∈Si
∧
s−i∈S−i s
′
i s−i si,
dom`+1(si) := Ki
∨
s′i∈Si
∧
s−i∈S−i
(
s′i s−i si ∨
∨
j∈N\{i} dom
`(sj)
)
.
Note that sj refers to j’s component of s−i. Note also that dom1(si) =
Kidomin
1(si) and that dom`+1(si) is defined in terms of dom`(si) and not
domin`(si).
So, in the base case, player i knows that si is strictly dominated if i knows that there
is an alternative strategy s′i which, for all joint strategies of the other players, is strictly
preferred. Furthermore, after iteration ` + 1, i knows that si is strictly dominated if i
knows that there is an alternative strategy s′i such that, for all joint strategies s−i of the
other players, either s′i is strictly preferred or some strategy sj in s−i is already known
by player j to be strictly dominated after iteration `.
Note that for ` > 1 each dom`(si) is a formula of L+ that contains occurrences of
all Kj operators. We restrict our attention to formulas dom`(si) with ` ∈ {1, . . . , ˆ`},
where ˆ` =
∑
i∈N |Si|. By their semantics there is some ` within this range such that
for all `′ ≥ `, dom`′ is equivalent to dom`. To reflect the fact that this can be seen as
the outcome of the iteration, we denote dom
ˆ`
by dom∞.
We now proceed to the main result of the paper. We prove that the non-epistemic
formulation of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, as defined in Sec-
tion 3, coincides with the epistemic formulation of strict dominance. As mentioned at
the beginning of this section, we can assume that G(H,M) is defined using the global
version of strict dominance, sdg .
Theorem 4.9. For any game G, hypergraphH , set of messagesM truthful with respect
to G, and i ∈ N ,
G(H,M)i = {si ∈ Si | (V,M) 2 dom∞(si)},
where V is the valuation induced by G.
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Note that, as described in Subsection 1.1, we assume common knowledge of ra-
tionality. Which strategies can be (iteratively) eliminated thus depends only on the
agents’ knowledge. The eliminations that can be performed in the epistemic situation
arising from a given state of communication are captured by the right-hand side of the
equation above.
Recall that the definition of the dom∞ relation involves knowledge operators Ki.
However, it does not rely on the common knowledge operators CA. In the course of the
proof of the above theorem (in Lemma A.4) we show that common knowledge is in fact
implicitly present here. The technical explanation for this fact is that in the definition
of dom∞ the operators Ki are nested and that in our context these operators distribute
both over conjunction and disjunction (Theorem 4.3).
5 Concluding remarks
We studied normal-form games in the presence of interaction structures. We assumed
that initially the players know only their own preferences, and that they can truthfully
communicate information about their own preferences within their parts of the interac-
tion structure. This allowed us to analyze the consequences of locality, formalized by
means of an interaction structure, on the outcome of the iterated elimination of strictly
dominated strategies. To this end we appropriately adapted the framework introduced
in (Apt et al., 2009) and showed that in any given state of communication this outcome
can be described by means of epistemic analysis.
5.1 Possible extensions
It would be interesting to extend the analysis here presented in a number of ways, by:
• allowing players to send information about the preferences of other players that
they learned through interaction.
• allowing other forms of messages, for example, messages containing information
that a strategy has been eliminated, or containing epistemic statements, such as
knowing that some strategy of another player has been eliminated;
• considering formation or evolution of interaction structures, given strategic ad-
vantages of certain interaction structures over others,
• (suggested by one of the referees) considering a set up in which each admitted
group of agents uses a correlation device to synchronize their actions,
• considering strategic aspects of communication, even if truthfulness is required
(should one send some piece of information or not?).
The last point is discussed further in the subsection below.
We are currently working on a distributed implementation of the aspects presented
in this paper, which we plan to extend and evaluate in a separate work. A preliminary
description is contained in (Witzel, 2009). The objective is to present it in a form of
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an agent-oriented program as suggested by Shoham (1993), where the agents’ motiva-
tional attitudes are based on their payoffs.
Finally, let us mention that in (Apt et al., 2009) we studied an abstract (so non-
game theoretic) setting in which players send messages that inform a group about some
atomic fact that a player knows or has learned. We clarified there, among other things,
under what conditions common knowledge of the underlying hypergraph matters. The
framework there considered could be generalized by allowing players to jointly arrive
at some conclusions using their background theories, by interaction through messages
sent to groups. From this perspective the form of IESDS studied here could be seen as
an instance of such a conclusion. Because of the form of allowed messages and back-
ground knowledge, this study would differ from the line of research pursued by Fagin
et al. (1995), where the effects of communication are considered in the framework of
distributed systems.
5.2 Strategic communication
Among the topics for future research especially incorporation of strategic communica-
tion into our framework is an interesting challenge. Note that we do not examine here
strategic or normative aspects of the communication. In fact, we do not allow players
to lie and do not even examine why they communicate or what they should truthfully
communicate to maximize their utilities. Rather, we examine what happens if they do
communicate, assuming that they are truthful, rational and have reasoning powers.
To justify this focus, it is helpful to realize that in some settings strategic aspects
of communication are not relevant. One possibility is when communication is not a
deliberate act, but rather occurs through observation of somebody’s behavior. Such
communication is certainly more difficult to manipulate and more laborious to fake
than mere words. In a sense it is inherently credible, and research in social learning
argues along similar lines (Chamley, 2004, Ch. 3).
In the setting of artificial agents communicating by messages, to view communica-
tion as something non-deliberate is more problematic. Here, ignoring strategic aspects
of communication can be interpreted as bounds on the players’ rationality or reasoning
capabilities—they simply lack the capabilities to deal with all the consequences of such
an inherently rich phenomenon as communication.
In general, strategic communication is a research topic on its own, with contro-
versial discussions (see, e.g., (Sally, 2005)) and many questions open. Crawford and
Sobel (1982) have considered the topic in a probabilistic setting, and Farrell and Rabin
(1996) have looked at related issues under the notion of cheap talk. Within epistemic
logic, formalizations of the information content of strategic communication have been
suggested, e.g., by Gerbrandy (2007).
5.3 Dynamics of group communication
Furthermore, the subject of group communication has other connections to epistemic
logic: the changes in knowledge that are brought about by various kinds of actions,
including some forms of communication, have been extensively examined in so-called
dynamic epistemic logic. Baltag et al. (1999) is an important early paper in this field,
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introducing an operation on epistemic models that allows for the rigorous analysis of
a very broad class of epistemic events. That class includes the announcements to sub-
groups that we in effect consider here. Baltag et al. (1999) study logics in which there
are, in addition to modal operators for knowledge and common knowledge, operators
[a]ϕ, meaning that after action a, ϕ holds. Our interest here is not directly related to
these concerns. We do not have (or need) a logic for describing states, and we con-
sider a specific communication protocol that is formalized by our notion of interaction
structure. We use this to induce a solution concept, whose epistemic foundation we
then study. On the other hand a dynamic epistemic logic might be helpful to describe
precisely the dynamics of the strategy elimination process, a topic that we do not con-
sider here.
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A Omitted Proofs
Proof of Theorem 3.2. We first prove the corresponding claim for the global version of
strict dominance, sdg , introduced before Lemma 4.6.
Consider A ⊆ A′ ⊆ N . By definition, this implies that for all restrictions G′ we
have TA′(G′) ⊆ TA(G′). Since sdg is monotonic, so is the operator TC for all C ⊆ N .
Hence by a straightforward induction T∞N ⊆ T∞A for all A ⊆ N , and consequently, for
all players i,
T∞N ⊆
⋂
A:i∈A∈H T
∞
A . (1)
Hence, for all i ∈ N ,
T∞N = T{i}(T
∞
N ) ⊆ T{i}(
⋂
A:i∈A∈H T
∞
A ),
where the inclusion holds by the monotonicity of T{i}. Consequently T∞N ⊆ G(H).
We now prove the original claim for the local version of strict dominance. We need
to distinguish the TC operator for sd and sdg . In the former case we write TC,l and in
the latter case TC,g . The reason that we use the latter operators is that they are mono-
tonic and closely related to the former operators. As a consequence of Lemma 4.6,
T∞C,l = T
∞
C,g . Now fix an arbitrary i ∈ N , then⋂
A:i∈A∈H T
∞
A,g =
⋂
A:i∈A∈H T
∞
A,l,
and by (1) for sdg , T∞N,g ⊆
⋂
A:i∈A∈H T
∞
A,g , so
T∞N,l = T
∞
N,g ⊆
⋂
A:i∈A∈H T
∞
A,l. (2)
Further, we have T∞N,l = T
∞
N,g and T
∞
N,g = T{i},g(T
∞
N,g), so T
∞
N,l = T{i},g(T
∞
N,l).
Hence, by (2) and monotonicity of T{i},g ,
T∞N,l = T{i},g(T
∞
N,l) ⊆ T{i},g(
⋂
A:i∈A∈H T
∞
A,l).
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Also, for all i ∈ N and all restrictions G′ we have, by definition,
T{i},g(G′) ⊆ T{i},l(G′),
so by the last inclusion
T∞N,l ⊆ T{i},l(
⋂
A:i∈A∈H T
∞
A,l).
Consequently, T∞N,l ⊆ G(H), as desired.
Proof of Lemma 4.6. We show that for all k ≥ 0 each globally (strictly) dominated
strategy is also locally dominated in Gk. Together with the straightforward fact that
local dominance implies global dominance, this proves the desired equivalence.
Formally, the claim is thus that for all k ≥ 0, si ∈ Si and s′i ∈ Gki such that
si Gk−i s′i, there is s′′i ∈ Gki with s′′i Gk−i s′i. To show this we prove by induction that
for all k ≥ 0 and si ∈ Si, there is s′′i ∈ Gki such that s′′i Gk−i si, from which the claim
follows since s′′i Gk−i si and si Gk−i s′i imply s′′i Gk−i s′i.
This claim clearly holds for k = 0. Now assume the statement holds for some k
and fix si ∈ Si. Choose some s′i ∈ Si that is Gk−i -maximal among the elements of
Si. By the induction hypothesis there is s′′i ∈ Gki such that s′′i Gk−i s′i. So also s′′i is
Gk−i -maximal among the elements of Si. Hence s′′i ∈ (sdg(Gk))i.
From sdg(Gk) ⊆ Gk+1 we now obtain s′′i ∈ Gk+1i . From Gk+1 ⊆ Gk and s′′i Gk−i
s′i, we obtain s
′′
i Gk+1−i s
′
i, and by the maximality of s
′
i, we also have s
′
i Gk+1−i si.
Thus, s′′i ∈ Gk+1i and s′′i Gk+1−i si, which concludes the proof of the induction step.
In order to prove Lemma 4.7, we need an auxiliary lemma dealing with operators
in a general setting. Given Y ∈ D and an operator T on a finite lattice (D,⊆), we
denote by TY the following operator:
TY (X) := T (X) ∪ (X ∩ Y ).
Note A.1. If the T operator is contracting, then so is TY .
Lemma A.2. Suppose that T and U are operators on a finite lattice (D,⊆) such that
T is monotonic and contracting. Then T∞T∞∩U∞(U
∞) = T∞ ∩ U∞.
Informally, this claim states that the combined effect of independent limit iterations
of T and U can be modelled by ‘serial’ limit iterations of T and U , provided the
operator T is modified to an appropriate TY form.
Proof. Denote for brevity T∞ ∩ U∞ by Y . First we prove by induction that for all
k ≥ 0
Y ⊆ T kY (U∞).
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The claim clearly holds for k = 0. Suppose it holds for some k ≥ 0. Then by the
induction hypothesis
T k+1Y (U
∞) = T (T kY (U
∞)) ∪ (T kY (U∞) ∩ Y ) ⊇ Y.
Hence
Y ⊆ T∞Y (U∞). (3)
To prove the converse implication we show by induction that for all k ≥ 0
T kY (U
∞) ⊆ T k.
The claim clearly holds for k = 0. Suppose it holds for some k ≥ 0. Then by the
induction hypothesis and the monotonicity of T
T k+1Y (U
∞) = TY (T kY (U
∞)) ⊆ TY (T k) = T k+1∪ (T k ∩Y ) ⊆ T k+1∪T∞ ⊆ T k+1.
Hence
T∞Y (U
∞) ⊆ T∞. (4)
Next, by Note A.1 the operator TY is contracting, so
T∞Y (U
∞) ⊆ U∞. (5)
Now the claim follows by (3), (4) and (5).
Proof of Lemma 4.7. Recall that H denotes the closure of H under non-empty inter-
section. Fix an interaction structure H , a set of messages M and i ∈ N . Assume for
simplicity that the set {A | i ∈ A ∈ H} has exactly two elements, say, Bi and Ci.
To deal with the arbitrary situation Lemma A.2 needs to be generalized to an arbitrary
number of operators. Such a generalization is straightforward and omitted.
Let now
G1 := (S1, . . . , Sn),
G2 := T∞Bi,M (G1),
G3 := Tˆ∞Ci,M (G2),
G4 := T{i}(G3),
where
TˆCi,M (G) := TCi,M (G) ∪ (G ∩ T∞Bi,M ∩ T∞Ci,M ).
Now, recall that
G(H,M)i :=
(
T{i},M
(⋂
A:i∈A∈H T
∞
A,M
))
i
.
By Lemma A.2, G3 = T∞Bi,M ∩ T∞Ci,M , so (G4)i is G(H,M)i, the ith component of
G(H,M). Note A.1 ensures that each of the operators TCi,M , TBi,M and TˆCi,M is
contracting. Moreover, sdg removes (weakly) more strategies than each of them, so
the sequence of restrictions
G1, TBi,M (G1), T 2Bi,M (G1), . . . ,G2, TˆCi,M (G2), Tˆ 2Ci,M (G2), . . . ,G3, G4
24
satisfies the conditions of Lemma 4.6. By Lemma 4.6 we also obtain the same restric-
tion G3 when in the definition of the TBi,M and TCi,M operators we use sd instead of
sdg . So the ith component G(H,M)i of G(H,M) is the same when in the definitions
of the TBi,M , TCi,M and T{i} operators we use sd
` instead of sdg .
This concludes the proof.
In order to prove Theorem 4.9, we need some preparatory steps.
Lemma A.3. For any ` ≥ 1, i ∈ N , si ∈ Si, and state (V,M),
(V,M)  dom`+1(si)
iff (V,M) 
∨
s′i∈Si
∧
s−i∈S−i
[(Kis
′
i s−i si) ∨
∨
A:i∈A∈H
∨
j∈A\{i}
CAdom
`(sj)].
Proof. We have
(V,M)  dom`+1(si)
iff (by definition)
(V,M)  Ki
∨
s′i∈Si
∧
s−i∈S−i
[s′i s−i si ∨
∨
j∈N\{i}
dom`(sj)]
iff (by Theorem 4.3)
(V,M) 
∨
s′i∈Si
∧
s−i∈S−i
[(Kis
′
i s−i si) ∨
∨
j∈N\{i}
Kidom
`(sj)]
iff
(V,M) 
∨
s′i∈Si
∧
s−i∈S−i
[(Kis
′
i s−i si) ∨
∨
A:i∈A∈H
∨
j∈A\{i}
CAdom
`(sj)].
To see that the downwards implication of the last step holds, note that dom`(sj) =
Kjϕ for appropriate ϕ. With Theorem 4.5, KiKjϕ implies C{i,j}ϕ. With an induc-
tion starting from Lemma 4.4 and using Theorem 4.3, this implies that there must be
messages in M jointly observed by i and j that entail ϕ. Each of these messages must
have been sent to some A ∈ H , and so all messages have been observed by some
A ∈ H with i, j ∈ A.
Lemma A.4. For any ` ≥ 1, i ∈ A ∈ H , si ∈ Si, and state (V,M),
si 6∈ (T `A,M )i iff (V,M)  CAdom`(si).
Proof. By induction on `. The base case follows straightforwardly from the definitions.
Now assume the claim holds for `. Then, focusing on the interesting case where A 6=
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{i}, we have the following chain of equivalences:
si 6∈ (T `+1A,M )i
iff (by definition)
si 6∈ (T `A,M )i or ¬sdgA,M (si, T `A,M )
iff (by contractivity of sdg)
¬sdgA,M (si, T `A,M )
iff (by definition)
∃s′i ∈ Si ∀s−i ∈ (T `A,M )−iMA s′i s−i si
iff
∃s′i ∈ Si ∀s−i ∈ S−i [MA s′i s−i si or
s−i 6∈ (T `A,M )−i]
iff
∃s′i ∈ Si ∀s−i ∈ S−i [MA s′i s−i si or
∃j ∈ A \ {i} sj 6∈ (T `A,M )j ]
iff (by induction hypothesis)
∃s′i ∈ Si ∀s−i ∈ S−i [MA s′i s−i si or
∃j ∈ A \ {i} (V,M)  CAdom`(sj)]
iff (by Lemma 4.4)
∃s′i ∈ Si ∀s−i ∈ S−i [ (V,M)  CAs′i s−i si or
∃j ∈ A \ {i} (V,M)  CAdom`(sj)]
iff
(V,M) 
∨
s′i∈Si
∧
s−i∈S−1
[CAs
′
i s−i si ∨
∨
j∈A\{i}
CAdom
`(sj)]
iff (by Theorem 4.3)
(V,M)  CA
∨
s′i∈Si
∧
s−i∈S−1
[s′i s−i si ∨
∨
j∈A\{i}
dom`(sj)]
iff (by definition of CA)
(V,M)  CAKi
∨
s′i∈Si
∧
s−i∈S−1
[s′i s−i si ∨
∨
j∈A\{i}
dom`(sj)]
iff (by definition of dom`+1(·))
(V,M)  CAdom`+1(si).
We are now ready to prove the main result.
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Proof of Theorem 4.9. Let
S′ :=
⋂
A:i∈A∈H T
∞
A,M .
We have:
si 6∈ G(H,M)i
iff (by definition)
si 6∈ (T{i},M (S′))i
iff
¬sdg{i},M (si, S′)
iff
∃s′i ∈ Si ∀s−i ∈ S′−i s′i s−i si
iff
∃s′i ∈ Si ∀s−i ∈ S−i (s′i s−i si or s−i 6∈ S′−i)
iff
∃s′i ∈ Si ∀s−i ∈ S−i ( s′i s−i si or
∃A : i ∈ A ∈ H s−i 6∈ (T∞A,M )−i)
iff
∃s′i ∈ Si ∀s−i ∈ S−i ( s′i s−i si or
∃A : i ∈ A ∈ H ∃j ∈ A \ {i} : sj 6∈ (T∞A,M )j)
iff (by Lemma A.4)
∃s′i ∈ Si ∀s−i ∈ S−i ( s′i s−i si or
(V,M) 
∨
A:i∈A∈H
∨
j∈A\{i}
CAdom
∞(sj))
iff (since s′i s−i si ∈ Ati)
∃s′i ∈ Si ∀s−i ∈ S−i ( (V,M)  Kis′i s−i si or
(V,M) 
∨
A:i∈A∈H
∨
j∈A\{i}
CAdom
∞(sj))
iff
(V,M) 
∨
s′i∈Si
∧
s−i∈S−i
[(Kis
′
i s−i si) ∨
∨
A:i∈A∈H
∨
j∈A\{i}
CAdom
∞(sj)]
iff (by Lemma A.3)
(V,M)  dom∞(si).
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